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NOTES
Employment Law: Gary v. Long - Using Context to
Analyze Threat in Sexual Harassment Cases
L Introduction
"No one fact may be decisive, but the sum total of them all might
be ...." A play cannot be understood on the basis of some of its
scenes but only on its entire performance, similarly, a discrimination
analysis must concentrate not on individual incidents but on the ;overall
scenario.'
Accurate consideration of an event requires more than an analysis of isolated
facts. While facts form the basis for analysis and serve as a guide to reach legal
conclusions, facts are devoid of true meaning without considering the context in
which they evolved. The context allows the fact finder to gain a full and accurate
vision of the occurrence and the effect it had on those involved. The importance
and usefulness of context is evident during the analysis of a sexual harassment
claim, where many of the conclusions rest on differing vantage points and varied
social factors.
Unfortunately, context is often the forgotten component in courts' analyses of
sexual harassment cases. The case of Gary v. Long2 illustrates the idea that unless
courts recognize the vital importance of context in sexual harassment analysis and
begin using context to color each harassment picture, harassment victims will not
receive justice. Use of context to analyze threats in sexual harassment cases is
critical despite the fact that the company had antiharassment procedures in place.
The policies implemented by a company to deter and provide remedies for sexual
harassment are of great value, and at times may weigh in favor of the defendant-
corporation. However, deferring to the presence of such organizational safeguards,
rather than engaging in a comprehensive contextual analysis of the underlying
threat, will result in a skewed view of the incident.
In today's society it is rare to find an individual who has not been touched in
some way by the social and legal phenomenon of sexual harassment. These two
words have come together and now symbolize a plethora of situations and thoughts,
each triggering a different interpretation according to the vantage point of the
individual involved. The different vantage points in each situation create a vital
1. WILLIAM PETROCELLI & BARBARA KATE REPA, SExuAL HARASSMENT ON THE JOB 2/19 to 2/20
(1992) (quoting Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1786 (M.D. Fla. 1991)).
2. 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1995), affg and remanding Gary v. Washington Metro. Area Transit
Auth., No. 90-3076, 1992 WL 714990 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 1992) (Gary 1).
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component of sexual harassment analysis - the context in which the threats were
made. Context is the sum total of the entire setting in which something occurs. It
may be comprised of the physical environment; individual personalities, sensitivities,
relationships, and personal histories; employment, financial, and family status; or
any other situations forming a background for the event or its reception. Analysis
of a sexual harassment claim and its underlying threat is improper when it fails to
consider the context in which the threat was made. The context can turn what one
person considers mere "saber rattling"3 into a real threat. That threat is the
foundation of a sexual harassment claim.
II. Historical Background
The United States Supreme Court has closely scrutinized sexual harassment
claims in two cases. Both contribute to the basic framework by which sexual
harassment claims are analyzed, as well as emphasize the importance of context in
the analysis. In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,4 the United States Supreme Court
established that a hostile working environment claim is actionable under Title VII
* of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII).' In addition, the Meritor Savings Bank Court
established the importance of context in relation to such claims by holding that
although an employer is not automatically liable for harassment by its supervisors,
neither the existence of a grievance procedure nor lack of notice of the harassment
insulates the employer from liability.6 The Court reasoned that facts such as those
reflecting the existence of antiharassment policies were relevant but not totally
dispositive on the issue of corporate liability, thus establishing the importance of
context as a crucial element for complete analysis. Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the majority in Meritor Savings Bank, specifically noted that the defendant's
grievance procedure required the victim to complain to the same individual who was
harassing her.7 Thus, the organizational safeguard established was not suited to
assist the individual being harassed.' In sum, the context largely dictated the
success of the grievance procedure as a safeguard to liability as well as the success
of the claim itself
In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
framework established by Meritor Savings Bank. The Harris Court held that Title
VII is violated when the workplace is so filled with severe discriminatory behavior
that a hostile working environment is created.' The Harris Court reasoned that the
standard required an objectively hostile or abusive environment, but that it was
3. See id. at 1396.
4. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
5. See id at 64-65.
6. See id. at 72-73.
7. See id. at 73.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
11. See id. at21.
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equally important to consider the victim's subjective perception of the abuse in that
environment." Ultimately, the Court held that a determination of whether the
environment was abusive or hostile could only be reached by an examination of all
the circumstances, again emphasizing the importance of context as a tool of
analysis. 3
Taken together, the Meritor Savings Bank and Harris decisions beg that context
become a focus in sexual harassment analyses. These two cases specifically dealt
with a determination of whether the context made the situation sufficiently hostile
to satisfy that facet of a hostile working environment claim. However, context
analysis should not be limited solely to that facet of hostile working environment
claims but logically should extend to quid pro quo sexual harassment analyses as
well. A necessary component of quid pro quo liability is that there be a real threat
toward an individual's employment through sexual advances. An analysis of the
context in which the threat was made is necessary to determine whether the threat
was indeed real in the eyes of the victim. "The [Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission] Compliance Manual strongly suggests that the conduct should be
judged from the viewpoint of the woman employee: 'The reasonable person standard
should consider the victim's perspective . . .,,'"" The decisions by the Supreme
Court in these two cases direct us to begin the analysis with an important question:
Given the context, why was the threat a real threat?
In Gary v. Long,5 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, examined the liability of a corporation for a sexual harassment
claim by one of its employees, Coramae Gary. The court ruled that the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) was not liable to Gary for violation
of Title VII.' The court held that because Gary could not reasonably have
believed her supervisor, Long, had the authority to carry out the threats made to her
employment, there was no basis for a sexual harassment claim against the
corporation. 7 The Gary court reasoned that for a claim to be successful the
supervisor must have misused authority delegated to him as a means to create an
adverse job situation upon rejection of the sexual advances toward the victim."
Because the threats to Gary never actualized, the court denied her claim of quid
pro quo sexual harassment. 9 Gary suffered no actual job detriment; therefore, the
court held that no valid quid pro quo claim materialized.' Because, according to
the court's reasoning, Gary should have known that the threat was not real, the court
12. See id. at 21-22.
13. Seeid. at22.
14. PETROCELU & REPA, supra note 1, at 2/16.
15. 59 F.3d 1391 (1995), affig and remanding Gary v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., No.
90-3076, 1992 WL 714990 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 1992) (Gary 1).
16. See id. at 1398.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 1396.
19. See id.
20. See id.
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then refused to find a hostile working environment claim.2' The court found that
WMATA had procedures in place to deal with harassment and, because they were
in place, Gary could not reasonably have believed that WMATA endorsed Long's
behavior. However, the court failed to explore the context of the situation. No
inquiry was made into the social, economic, or power factors that made the
harassment and threats of job detriment very real to Gary, real enough that she felt
she had no reasonable course of action.
By refusing to find an actionable sexual harassment claim because Gary lacked
reasonableness in per'ceiving the veracity of the threat, the court placed a large
burden on the victim. According to that reasoning, it is the victim's responsibility
to analyze threats to determine the actual strength of the threat before a situation of
sexual harassment may be considered real.
The Gary decision implies that without suffering an actual detriment to
employment the treatment endured was not sufficiently real to be actionable. This
shifts the court's focus from an analysis of threat to a test for actual damage. How
could a court determine what constitutes a real threat without an examination of the
context of the threat? The reality of sexual threats is largely a personal matter from
the victim's perspective, for example, "how it feels, [and] what you can do about
it. 23
The Gary decision seems to take a step away from the notion and importance of
a person's right to work in an environment free from harassment. The decision
further perpetuates the difficult social and cultural situations that many people have
been forced to endure. Discrimination within corporate organizations continues to
make it difficult for many women to compete with men for jobs.u By ignoring
contextual issues such as power, job status inequalities, financial dependence, and
gender constructs, the reality of the harassment is not reflected.
This note will discuss the current standards used to analyze sexual harassment
claims, and the necessity of determining the context to accurately apply those
standards. Further, this note will present the facts, holding, and reasoning of Gary
and will give a critique on how the outcome of the decision could have been altered
by careful consideration of the realistic social concerns that created the context of
the threat in this case. The examination of social forces as part of the context in
sexual harassment cases could well establish a more realistic system of review for
future sexual harassment claims.
I1. Gary v. Long
Coramae Gary, an employee of the defendant WMATA, brought an action against
her employer and her supervisor, defendant James Edward Long. Gary alleged that
the defendants violated Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act and committed
21. See id. at 1398.
22. See id.
23. PETROCELLI & RJSPA, supra note 1, at 3/2.
24. See James E. Gruber & Lars Bjorn, Women's Responses to Sexual Harassment: An Analysis of
Sociocultural, Organizational, and Personal Resource Models, 67 Soc. Sd. Q. 814, 815-16 (1986).
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various torts. These actions were brought because Gary was subjected to repeated
sexual advances and job threats by Long. In 1983, Gary began working for
WMATA as a custodian.' Four years later, she was promoted to the position of
stock clerk for WMATA. Gary's immediate supervisor was Mr. Charles Brown.
The defendant, Long, was Brown's immediate supervisor and Gary's second-level
supervisor.'
In 1988, Long began what would become a pattern of sexual advances toward
Gary.' Long told Gary that if she would engage in a sexual relationship with him,
he would make her job easier.' Gary refused these advances. Upon Gary's refusal,
Long repeatedly threatened her with detrimental job consequences, including
termination of her employment with WMATA." As part of the sexual advances,
"Long made crude references to her body, regularly expressed his desire to have sex
with her, [and] threatened to 'get' her for refusing to meet with him."3 In addition,
Long told Gary that if she informed anyone about his actions she and her husband,
who also worked for WMATA,32 would be fired.33 Throughout the span of
harassment, Gary made it apparent that she would not accept Long's advances and
that they were not welcomed.
In June 1989, all of the employees were to take a tour of the new WMATA
facility where the operations were being moved." Long drove Gary to the new
location for an individual tour, and while doing so he "fondled her breasts and
rubbed his hands between her legs."' Upon reaching a secluded storage facility,
Long raped Gary.37 Again, Long threatened Gary with detrimental job consequen-
ces if she reported the incident?
Gary took a leave of absence following an automobile accident, and, upon her
return in January 1990, verbal harassment by Long began again.39 Gary
anonymously reported Long's harassment on February 14, 1990, to a counselor
provided by WMATA, stating that she had been afraid to tell anyone.' Gary took
a leave of absence from WMATA on February 22, 1990, then filed a formal
25. See Gary, 59 F.3d at 1393.
26. See Gary v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. 90-3076, 1992 WL 714990, at *1
(D.D.C. Dec. 2, 1992) (Gary 1), affd and remanded sub nom. Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C. Cir.
1995).
27. See id.
28. See Gary, 59 F.3d at 1393.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 1394.
31. Id.
32. See Gary 1, 1992 WL 714990, at *1.
33. See Gary, 59 F.3d at 1394.
34. See id.
35. See Gary I, 1992 WL 714990, at *1.
36. Gary, 59 F.3d at 1394.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See Gary 1, 1992 WL 714990, at *2.
1997]
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grievance with WMATA' WMATA subsequently conducted its own investigation
of the incident and found "no corroborating evidence" of the harassment."' Gary
was then transferred to another facility to avoid contact with Long.43 In May 1990,
Gary filed her complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC)," a prerequisite to bringing a Title VII claim in court.' Gary was given
a right-to-sue letter by the EEOC, and her Title VII claim included allegations of
hostile working environment and quid pro quo sexual harassment."
The United State.,; District Court for the District of Columbia denied Long's
motion for summary judgment on the Title VII issues but granted the summary
judgment in favor of WMATA, holding the corporation could not be held liable for
the conduct of Long.47 The court held that when an employer: (1) had done
nothing to indicate that it approved of the actions of the supervisor; (2) had
established a strong policy against sexual harassment including the implementation
of a complaint procedure; and (3) took prompt remedial action, the company could
not be held liable for the harassment by one of its supervisors.' The court also
held that because Gzary had not notified WMATA while the harassment was taking
place, no allegations could stand that WMATA knew or should have known that
Gary was being harassed.49 The court found that this was an essential requisite to
a hostile environment charge and, therefore, the claim must fail."
On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit Court upheld the grant of summary
judgment in favor Of WMATA.5" The court held that Gary failed to make out a
claim of quid pro quo52 sexual harassment5 3 The court also held that although the
harassment was sufficiently pervasive to constitute a hostile working environment,
Gary "could not have reasonably believed that Long had the authority, apparente
41. See Gary, 59 F.3d at 1394.
42. Id.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. Most states have fair employment practice (PEP) statutes that provide at a minimum the
protection afforded under the Civil Rights Act. Filing a claim under the EEOC will protect your rights
under both. However, an individual may not file a Civil Rights Claim for harassment directly in court.
Filing a claim with the EEOC is a prerequisite to use of the Civil Rights Act. The EEOC will issue a
"right-to-sue" letter which allows an individual to file a lawsuit to enforce his or her civil rights. If the
EEOC feels an individuzls claim cannot be proven it will then issue a "no cause" determination. See
PETROCELI & REPA, supra note 1, at 5/2, 5/3, 6/3, 6/5.
46. See Gary, 59 F.3d at 1394.
47. See Gary 1, 1992 WL 714990, at *4.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See Gary, 59 F.3d at 1400.
52. See infra text accompanying notes 62-63.
53. See Gary, 59 F.3d at 1396.
54. The court's use of "apparent" refers to the legal definitions of "actual" and "apparent" under
agency law - the lawful delegation of power by one person to another. Power of agent to affect legal
relations of the principal by acts done in accordance with principal's manifestation of consent to agent.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 (1958).
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or otherwise, to sexually harass her."5 Therefore, WMATA could not be held
liable for Long's harassment of Gary.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made it illegal "for an employer.., to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's...
sex. .. ."' In 1980, the EEOC issued guidelines for interpreting Title VII of the
Act.' Those guidelines are as follows:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual
harassment when
1. submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly
a term or condition of an individual's employment;
2. submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used
as the basis for employment decisions affecting such an individual; or
3. such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering
with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile or offensive working environment.58
In 1993, the EEOC included gender harassment in its guidelines.59 Examples of
gender harassment include conduct such as "taunts and gestures" as well as
"threatening, intimidating or hostile acts."' The sexual harassment definitions are
generally understood to include two types of claims: quid pro quo and hostile
working environment." Quid pro quo sexual harassment consists of the grant or
denial of an economic quid pro quo in exchange for sexual favors. 2 The main
impetus of a quid pro quo claim is that some tangible aspect of an employee's job
is conditioned on submission to sexual advances and that detrimental employment
consequences follow from the employee's refusal.-
The Gary court reasoned that it "takes more than saber rattling alone to impose
quid pro quo liability on an employer; the supervisor must have wielded the
authority entrusted to him to subject the victim to adverse job consequences as a
result of her refusal to submit to unwelcome sexual advances."'64 The court relied
on a Sixth Circuit case which held that for there to be liability, the employee must
have suffered some actual job detriment as a result of falling to participate in the
supervisor's demands. The court held that even though Long threatened Gary with
55. Gary, 59 F.3d at 1398.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
57. See MARY P. Koss Er AL., No SAFE HAVEN 115 (1994).
58. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1996).
59. See Koss Er AL., supra note 57, at 115.
60. Id.
61. See Gary, 59 F.3d at 1395.
62. See Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d 777, 782-83 (1st Cir. 1990).
63. See Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 579 (2d Cir. 1989).
64. Gary, 59 F.3d at 1396.
65. See id. (citing Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 186 (6th Cir. 1992)).
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detrimental job consequences, those threats were never carried out; therefore, Gary
failed to make out a sufficient quid pro quo claim.'
According to Meiltor Savings Bank v. Vinson,67 a supervisor's threats of job
detriment or benefit conditioned on sexual advances may contribute to a hostile
working environment, even if not actionable as quid pro quo sexual harassment.'
The Meritor Savings Bank Court continued that such conduct may support an action
if it is "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's]
employment and create an abusive working environment."'" Title VII provides that
employees have the right to work in an atmosphere devoid of "discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule and insult."7 A hostile working environment claim is a
middle standard of analysis of sexual harassment in the workplace."' It encompas-
ses those situations which fall between "making actionable any conduct merely
offensive, and... [those] caus[ing] tangible psychological injury. ' '7
Title VII guidelines provide that sexual harassment constituting a hostile working
environment may be comprised of "sexual misconduct.., whether or not it is
directly linked to the grant or denial of an economic quid pro quo. '73 In addition,
the conduct must have the purpose or effect of "unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work
environment."'
The Gary court held that Long's behavior was without a doubt sufficiently
pervasive enough to constitute a hostile working environment sexual harassment
claim.75 The court fcund the abuse that Long imposed on Gary, if proven true, to
be "not only pervasive harassment but also criminal conduct of the most serious
nature."'7 However, because the court found that Gary could not reasonably have
believed WVIATA gave Long authority to sexually harass her, it would not extend
liability to the company.' In essence, the court found that the threats to Gary's
employment were not real - that Gary should have realized the threats to her
employment would never be carried out.
The Gary court reached its decision in part by applying common law principles
of agency. 8 According to these principles, an employer is not automatically liable
for the acts committed by an employee outside the scope of employment.7
66. See Gary, 59 E.3d at 1396. But see Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 513 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding
discussions of job benefits or detriments in same sentence with request for sexual favors constitutes quid
pro quo sexual harassment).
67. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
68. See id. at 65.
69. Id. at 67.
70. Id. at 65.
71. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (.1993).
72. Il
73. Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. at 65.
74. Id.
75. See Gary, 59 F.3d at 1397.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 1398.
78. See id.
79. The Restatement provides that "a master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants
[Vol. 50:117
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However, the Restatement (Second) of Agency provides three exceptions through
which an employer may be held liable for such actions of an employee.' The
Gary court refused to apply the exception given in § 219(d) of the RESTATEMENT
to find WMATA liable in this case.' According to this exception, the employer
may be held liable if "the servant purported to act on behalf of the principal and
there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the
tort by the existence of the agency relation."'2
The Gary court reasoned that Gary could not rely on the exception because "she
could not have believed... that Long was acting within the color of his
authority."'" The court relied on a 1994 Third Circuit decision in the case of
Bouton v. BMW of North America, Inc.,' which "requires the belief in the agent's
apparent authority ... before the principal will be bound."' Without considering
the context of the threats, the Gary court reasoned that because WMATA had in
place policies and procedures to handle claims of sexual harassment, Gary should
have known that WMATA did not tolerate such actions and that the threat was not
real.' The court further reasoned that Gary "could [have] report[ed] ... [the
threats] to the employer without fear of adverse consequences."' The Gary court
relied solely on the existence of policies against sexual harassment to conclude that
Gary should have known that the threats were not real, regardless of how the threats
were interpreted by Gary.
IV. Analysis Through Context
By avoiding context, the Gary court foreclosed the most accurate result even
though it applied the correct standards. Social influences such as power, gender, and
job status inequalities, and their effect on targeting and victim responses, are
essential to correctly frame and evaluate a harassment claim, as was emphasized in
acting outside the scope of their employment." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1958).
80. In Bouton, the court recognized:
The Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219 provides three potential bases for holding
employers liable for sexual harassment perpetrated by their employees. Section 219(1)
holds employers responsible for torts comnmitted by their employees within the scope of
their employment.... Under § 219(2)(b), masters are liable for their own negligence or
recklessness; in a harassment case, this is typically negligent failure to discipline or fire,
or failure to take remedial action upon notice of harassment. Finally, under § 219(2)(d),
if the servant relied upon apparent authority or was aided by the agency relationship, the
master is required to answer.
Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 106 (3d Cir. 1994).
81. See Gary, 59 F.3d at 1397.
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1987).
83. See Gary, 59 F.3d at 1397-98.
84. 29 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 1994).
85. Id. at 109. But see Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (MacKinnon, J.,
concurring) ("In a sense, a supervisor is always 'aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the
agency' because his responsibilities provide proximity to, and regular contact with the victim.").
86. See Gary, 59 F.3d at 1398.
87. Id.
1997]
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Meritor Savings Bank and Harris. Through a careful contextual analysis, the threats
to Gary, deemed to have been unrealistic by the court, could appear to be very real.
With a determination that the threat was real to Gary, it is likely that WMATA
would not have escaped liability for Long's actions.
The Gary court missed the point because it did not treat context realistically.
"The EEOC regulations make clear that most sexual harassment cases can only be
resolved by looking at all the facts in context."' The EEOC regulations specifical-
ly state:
In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment,
the [EEOC] will look at the record as a whole and at the totality of the
circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context
in which the alleged incidents occurred. The determination of the
legality of a particular action will be made from the facts, on a case-by-
case basis.'
The Supreme Court emphasized the EEOC's position in Meritor Savings Bank by
considering all the circumstances and the context in which the harassment took
place.' In Nichols v. Frank,91 the Ninth Circuit added that there is no justification
for the lack of a detailed examination of all the "relevant facts and circumstances,
as well as the application of common sense, sound general principles, and a true
understanding of human nature."' It logically follows that consideration of relevant
social forces and an individual's personal resources is necessary to adequately
evaluate a sexual harassment claim.
The EEOC's definition of sexual harassment clearly demonstrates that physical
touching does not have to exist for there to be sexual harassment." In fact, "the
non-touching forms [of sexual harassment] may be just as intimidating."'  This
"climate of intimidation"'95 created by the harassment forms part of the context of
the harassment and may establish the reality of the threat from the victim's
perspective.
88. PETROCELLI & REPA, supra note 1, at 2/3.
89. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1996) (emphasis added).
90. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986).
91. 42 F.3d 503 (9th Cir. 1994).
92. Id. at 513.
93. The EEOC defines sexual harassment in the Code of Federal Regulations:
Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of [the law]. Unwelcome sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature
constitute sexual harassment when: (1) submission to such conduct is made either
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment; (2) submission
to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment
decisions affecting such individual; or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably inteifering with an individual's work performance or creating an in-
timidating, hostile or offensive working environment.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1996).
94. PETROCELLI & REPA, supra note 1, at 1/5.
95. Id. at 1/9.
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A. Victim's Personal Resources
One of the many factors creating the context of the harassment includes the
manner in which individuals respond to the harassment. The choices individuals
make in responding to harassment may indicate the degree of strength and reality
with which the thrdat is received. The way in which a person responds in any
situation is guided, at least in part, by societal forces that have influenced the
person's life and created the point of reference from which that individual responds.
"Personal resources are both social products and social forces;" they are "shaped by
external forces and they guide and influence our behavior."' Personal resources
may be affected by several social, cultural, and organizational forces such as race,
sex, social class, occupational status, education, and income, all of which, in turn,
affect human behavior."
When an incident of sexual harassment occurs, an individual's personal resources
are invoked to guide his or her coping behavior. Studies have shown that "though
all women who experience sexual harassment are faced with a potential loss of
personal resources, not all women are affected in the same manner.""8 The fact that
women react differently when faced with sexual harassment stems in part from the
fact that the personal resources that each individual draws from have varying
support structures and have been shaped by different life experiences." A single
parent on a fixed income may lack the support structure necessary to challenge or
second-guess a threat to her employment.m  Different reactions to sexual
harassment may indicate the "realness" of the threat as perceived by that particular
victim."0' These aspects cannot be ignored, and as the Court in Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc." indicated, should become an important part of the analysis.
The strength of personal resources may influence a person's ability to confront
harassment and question the authority of the one making threats.' These personal
resources include the way each individual has been socialized to view his or her
role in the workplace. A woman's view of her role in the workplace may have been
96. "The term 'personal' is used to refer to internal evaluations of ourselves and our lives, such as
self-esteem, personal control, or satisfaction. The term 'resources' is used as opposed to psychological
'states' in order to stress the idea that they can be tapped by the individual during role playing, facework,
or interpersonal negotiations." Gruber & Bjorn, supra note 24, at 815-16.
97. See id. at 815; see also James E. Gruber & Michael D. Smith, Women's Responses to Sexual
Harassment: A Multivariate Analysis, 17 BASIc & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 543, 557 (1995).
98. Gruber & Bjorn, supra note 24, at 815; see also Gruber & Smith, supra note 97, at 557.
99. See Gruber & Bjorn, supra note 24, at 815; see also Gruber & Smith, supra note 97, at 546-47.
100. The number of families in which a woman is the sole means of support is growing. "Between
1980 and 1990, the number of female-headed families in the U.S. increased by 27% until they now
account for more than 21% of all families with children under 18." PErROCELU & REPA, supra note 1,
at 1/8.
101. The viewpoint of the victim, male or female, is a more accurate standard of review than of a
reasonable person in general. See id at 2/16.
102. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
103. "Surveys of women who have been sexually harassed indicate that less than 7% of them file
a formal legal complaint or seek legal help." PETROCELLI & REPA, supra note 1, at 3/2 (quoting
WVOMEN'S LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, THE IMPAcT OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT (1991)).
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shaped through messages conveyed in the home from parents, as well as the
media. °4 These socialized roles have an impact on work situations, particularly
as individuals consider challenging abuse. °" Each person in a harassment situation
must decide whether to continue in these roles and must consider what risks are
ahead should he or she challenge the harassment."
B. Power Inequalities
Another contextuad factor that frames the harassment situation is the extent of
power inequalities that exist between the harasser and the victim."4 Relative
powerlessness has a large impact on which women are targeted for harassment and
how they are able to respond."4 Women as a group do not possess as much
organizational power as men. °" By possessing less power, an economic dependen-
cy is created, which may unfortunately lead to "sexual extortion.""' "Women with
low seniority, . . . are more apt to be targets of sexual harassment."' Studies
reflect that "men in supervisory positions are overrepresented in harassment
incidents.""' "[W]omen are more able to adapt a wider range of responses when
the source does not have more organizational power.""' It becomes clear that a
power inequality may work to suppress a victim and create a serious and real threat
by limiting his or her available responses.
The status and character of a woman's job has a powerful effect on the way she
interprets and responds to threats and harassment."4 Women who possess less
"cultural power and status advantages are especially apt to be targets of sexual
harassment.""' 5 Women who are more likely to be targets of sexual harassment
include those with low-skill and low-status jobs, or those who work in once male-
dominated areas where they are now considered the "threatening minority."..6 Jobs
of this level include custodial and manual positions, such as the stock shelver
position held by Gary.
104. See GINNY NICARTHY Er AL., YOU DON'T HAVE TO TAKE IT 92 (1993).
105. See id
106. See id.
107. See Gruber & Bjorn, supra note 24, at 815; see also Gruber & Smith, supra note 97, at 547.
108. See Gruber & Bjorn, supra note 24, at 815; see also Gruber & Smith, supra note 97, at 547.
109. See Gruber & Bjorn, supra note 24, at 815.
110. See id
111. I at 816; see also Mark L. Lengnick-Hall, Sexual Harassment Research: A Methodological
Critique, 48 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 841, 847 (1995) ("Victims of harassment are usually those lowest in
organizations (i.e., those with less status and power).").
112. Gruber & Bjota, supra note 24, at 816.
113. Gruber & Smith, supra note 97, at 558.
114. See Gruber & ljorn, supra note 24, at 816.
115. Id.; see also Lengnick-Hall, supra note 111, at 847.
116. See Gruber & Bjorn, supra note 24, at 816; see also Lengnick-Hall, supra note 111, at 847
("Younger women who are single or divorced, working in either nontraditional jobs (e.g. blue collar jobs)
or in a predominately male working environment or for a male supervisor, are more likely to be harassed
than other women.").
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Many of the factors that placed these women in the less powerful positions are
the same factors that reduce and limit their "repertoire" of responses.1 7 This
perpetuated harassment has been dubbed a "self-fulfilling link.""' The women who
are in the low status jobs are the more frequent targets of sexual harassment in the
workplace and respond to the harassment with "weak and nonconfrontational"
responses that characterize those who are victimized." 9 In general, "women
harassed by supervisors give more passive responses than those harassed by co-
workers."'" Women are also more likely to quit the job when harassed by a
supervisor than when harassed by a co-worker.' It has been posited that these
weak responses create the ideal harassment situation for which the harasser is
looking.'" When the context reveals an oppressive situation with passive responses
such as this, the supervisor's threat may take on additional strength.
C. Victim's Perception of Authority
An employee may not be aware of where actual authority to make employment
decisions within the organization lies. Under Title VII, only an employer is
prohibited from creating a sexually discriminating situation." In addition, under
Title VII "employers are held strictly accountable if they place in positions of
authority persons who extract sexual favors from those over whom they exercise
power.""u From this language it can be inferred that the power need not be an
actual vested authority. Real or not, a supervisor could "exercise" authority in order
to achieve his goals. The essence, then, is that "an individual relies upon his
apparent or actual authority [in order] to extort sexual consideration from an
117. See Gruber & Bjorn, supra note 24, at 816.
118. Id. at 821.
119. See id.
120. Id. The Gruber and Bjorn study analyzed the responses of women to harassment.
The women who were harassed were asked "How did you handle this harassment?" The
variable measuring the directness or assertiveness of the response to the harasser was
developed by categorizing the 11 types [of responses given] into three levels as follows:
"passive" (ignoring it, walking away, pretending not to notice); "deflective" (using humor,
stalling, telling co-workers or friends, responding mildly); and "assertive" (attacking
verbally, responding physically, taking of threatening to take the matter to someone in a
position of authority). Approximately 29 percent of the women gave passive responses;
nearly 45 percent used deflective responses; and slightly less than 26 percent gave
assertive responses.
Id.; see also Sarah Barton Samoluk & Grace M.H. Pretty, The Impact of Sexual Harassment Simulations
on Women's Thoughts and Feelings, 30 SEx ROLES 679, 693 (1994) ("Interpersonal sexual harassment
by a boss is, on the average, more distressing.").
121. See Gruber & Smith, supra note 97, at 554 (stating that women in the study "were more likely
to quit a job when the harasser was a supervisor (12.5%) as opposed to either a coworker (1.2%) or
client/customer (.8%)").
122. See Gruber & Bjorn, supra note 24, at 823.
123. See Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1395 (D.C. Cir. 1995), affg and remanding Gary v.
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. 90-3076, 1992 WL 714990 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 1992) (Gary 1).
124. Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 510 (9th Cir. 1994).
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employee."" Therefore, the essential question should not be whether the harassed
employee should have known that the supervisor in question could actually have
carried out all of his or her threats; rather, the question should be whether there was
at least apparent authority to do so. It may seem apparent and unquestionable to a
low-status employee that a second-level supervisor would have the power to
terminate his or her employment.
Often the employer is not aware of the authority being flexed by a supervisory
employee over others. However, under traditional agency principles, the concept of
respondeat superior operates to create liability on the part of the employer for the
exercise of actual o: apparent authority by a supervisor." "Supervisors are in
unique positions of power in the workplace."'" The victimizer is able to back up
his or her threats only because of the actual or apparent authority that has been
granted to him by his employer." The victim may know only that the person
making the threats holds a position of some authority, and not necessarily where
that individual's authority stops. Because of these contextual ambiguities, it is
possible for a technically invalid threat to appear to have real force and conse-
quence.
D. Victim's Recourse
When a worker is harassed in the workplace, he or she normally has little other
recourse beyond that which the law provides.'" For economic reasons, leaving the
job in which the harassment occurs may not be an option because of the difficulty
in finding suitable employment.'" Corporations against whom sexual harassment
claims have been alleged may try to ward off their liability by suggesting that the
employee did not apprise himself or herself of antiharassment policies by reporting
the incident. However, victims continue to reveal that fear of retaliation by the
company is a major hinderance to reporting sexual harassment.' The Chamberlin
v. 101 Realty, Inc."' decision pointed out that the finder of fact must consider that
the victim "may reasonably perceive that her recourse to more emphatic means of
communicating the unwelcomeness of the supervisor's sexual advances, as by
registering a complaint ... may prompt the termination of her employment.""'
A woman in a low-skill job likely will not have the financial stability to challenge
a system that is providing the only monetary support immediately available to her.
125. Il at 509 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (11th Cir. 1982)).
126. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1983); see also Miller v. Bank of Am.,
600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979).
127. PETROCELLI & REPA, supra note 1, at 2/5.
128. See Nichols, 42 F.3d at 514.
129. See id. at 510.
130. See id.
131. See Louise F. Fitzgerald & Suzanne Swan, Why Didn't She Just Report Him? The
Psychological and Legal Implications of Women's Responses to Sexual Harassment, J. Soc. IssuEs,
'Spring 1995, at 117, 127.
132. 915 F.2d 777 (lit Cir. 1990).
133. Id. at 784.
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Other contextual factors, such as threats extending to a spouse's job, -as was the case
in Gary, may further compound the situation." Economic stress such as this may
give additional strength to a supervisor's threat.
Research shows that men and women assign blame differently in situations
involving harassment. In a study of the assignment of responsibility in sexual
harassment, Inger W. Jensen and Barbara Gutek found that "more responsibility was
assigned to the victim of sexual harassment by the male than the female respon-
dents." 3S This may carry over into the employment realm and manifest itself in
company policy as a defensive means for a company to avoid blame." Women
characterized into one of the two "self-blame" categories were found to be less
likely to report the incident "to anyone in authority."'37 The nonreporting is a
result of "internalizing" the blame to find fault within herself.' It is not surprising
then to find that women often do not readily report situations of sexual harassment.
If a woman views herself as having caused or invited the harassment, then why
would she report the situation? This may also explain why many women do not
report incidents of harassment through the institutional procedures put in place by
their employers.
V. Context Applied to Gary v. Long
The Gary court's reasoning creates further victimization. According to its
reasoning, in order for a threat to be the basis for a successful claim, the plaintiff
must not only be subjected to the harassment, but further, the victim must accurately
assess the actuality of the threat while experiencing it. In essence, the Gary court
states that sexual harassment based on threats of tangible job detriment made with
apparent authority to be carried out is not sufficient to satisfy a claim. However,
this is in direct conflict with the Ninth Circuit decision in Nichols v. Frank,39
which held that a supervisor's "intertwining of a request for the performance of
sexual favors with a discussion of actual or potential job benefit or detriments in a
single conversation constitutes quid pro quo sexual harassment."'" This was the
situation in the Gary case. The courts often fail to consider whether the harassed
individual is in a position to take a risk that the threat might be carried out. Gary
did not submit to the advances, but they were a constant and real threat to her
employment.
The Gary court only used contextual factors that were written in policies, not the
social context as it affected Gary. The Gary court held that Gary should have
134. See Gary v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. 90-3076, 1992 WL 714990, at *2
(D.D.C. Dec. 2, 1992) (Gary 1), affd and remanded sub nom. Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C. Cir.
1995).
135. Inger Jensen & Barbara Gutek, Attributions and Assignment of Responsibility in Sexual
Harassment. J. Soc. IssuEs, Winter 1982, at 121, 124.
136. See id. at 121.
137. l. at 126; see also Sanoluk & Pretty, supra note 120, at 694.
138. See Jensen & Gutek, supra note 135, at 128.
139. 42 F.3d 503 (9th Cir. 1994).
140. Id. at 513.
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known that Long did not have the power or authority to carry out the threats he
imposed."" In addition, the Gary court held that WMATA had implemented
procedural safeguards to handle and prevent the harassment that Gary faced and,
therefore, WMATA could not be held liable when Gary failed to make adequate use
of those procedures." The Gary court deviated from the language of the Supreme
Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.' 3 In Meritor Savings Bank, the Court
reasoned that the existence of a grievance procedure, though relevant, should not be
totally dispositive on the issue of corporate liability for sexual harassment."
Likewise, neither should the existence of an organizational policy or procedure be
the sole consideration on an underlying issue such as threat, especially when that
sole issue determines the outcome of the case. Consideration of the context should
have been part of the analysis or the existence of threat and the fear of reporting
experienced by Gary.
Even though Long did not actually have the authority to carry out his threats, his
actions should satisfy a claim of sexual harassment because he presented himself
as having the authority necessary to cause the threatened tangible detriments to
Gary's employment. Long constructed the authority through his own portrayal of the
power that was entrusted to him by WMATA as a second-level supervisor. It is not
unreasonable that Gary would assume that her second-level supervisor would have
sufficient power to effectuate his threats. These realistic contextual factors, when
coupled with Gary's perception of the power hierarchy, could have been deemed
quid pro quo sexual harassment where her employment success was conditioned on
the sexual advances made.
Gary did not pos&ess the power and resources necessary to respond to the
harassment through the organizational procedures as the court held she should have.
Had the court examined the context present in the Gary case, the threat could have
been interpreted as real, and a different outcome might have been reached. Gary
was a stock shelver for WMATA. Only a short time before the harassment began,
Gary had been a custodian for WMATA. She did not possess a high-skilled job, nor
one that was regarded with an appreciable degree of respect. This left her in a
relatively powerless position to confront and handle the harassment that she faced.
It is doubtful that Gary was familiar enough with the organizational structure of
WMATA to know where the hiring and firing capabilities rested. Neither is it far-
fetched to believe that even a second-level supervisor, who in reality could not have
fired her, did have enough "pull" to affect her job situation. Long likely had the
ability to give assignments and could reasonably have used this ability against Gary
in her working capacity.
It cannot be expected that someone in Gary's position would have faith enough
in a system which allowed Long to harass her, to partake of the institutional
"safeguards" that WMATA provided. It is possible that from her perspective, Gary
141. See Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1398 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
142. See id at 1398.
143. 477 U.S. 57 (1936).
144. See id. at 72-73.
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saw herself as becoming nothing more than a "troublemaker" in the company's eyes,
holding a position that would not be difficult to replace. Gary might have felt her
job was necessary to maintain a stable home life and provide the support her
daughter needed to finish high school. These social factors might explain Gary's
passive response and genuine fear of the harassment she endured. None of the
contextual experiences discussed above were considered in Gary.
"In a supervisor-subordinate relationship, very little conduct of a sexual nature is
needed to support a finding of sexual harassment." '145 This being the case,
"realness of threat" should never take over and become the focus of the analysis,
and certainly not without considering context. Anytime a supervisor threatens a
subordinate sexually it should be treated as an automatic indication of sexual
harassment. The mere existence of such a threat should satisfy a threshold
requirement for corporate liability. The court should then shift the burden to the
defendant corporation to show that other factors existed to avoid liability. Context
must then be used by the court to reach its decision.
VI. Conclusion
The eradication of discriminatory practices throughout society is of extreme
importance. Sex discrimination in the form of sexual harassment is a real force that
keeps people from achieving their rightful status in employment. To base a decision
on the procedural and interpretative errors that Gary made is to deny her the
protections offered by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Title VII represents an
effort to protect individuals who are in weak positions from discriminatory
situations that those individuals are not equipped to handle alone.
The decision in Gary is a deviation from the current trend of victim protection
in sexual harassment cases. However, it does provide an opportufiity to examine
current standards and policies pertaining to the legal battle involved with sexual
harassment. Corporations must be held accountable for the actions of those placed
in positions of authority. Institutional procedures should be in place to cope with
discrimination and harassment as these problems arise. Procedures and policies
should not, however, be used as a means of freeing corporations from liability for
sexual harassment that does occur. In the future, courts should give more
consideration to the context in which the harassment occurred as part of an effort
to more justly compensate those who have been wronged.
Donald P. Howerton
145. PETROCELU & REPA, supra note 1, at 2/6.
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